/S0aanes 1979/provides some counterexamples to the theory of natural language presuppositions that is presented in /Gazdar 1979/. /Soames 1982/ provides a theory which explains these eounterexamples. /Mercer 1987/ rejects the solution found in/Soames 1982/ leaving these eounterexamples unexplained. By reappraising these insightful counterexamples, the inferential theory for natural language presuppositions described in/Mercer 1987, 1988/gives a simple and straightforward explanation for the presupposiitional nature of these sentences.
Introduction
/ provides some intriguing counterexamples to the method for deriving natural language presuppositions presented in /Gazdar 1979/. A proposed modification to Gazdar~s method (/Landman 1981/) which attempts to solve the problem exhibited by these couuterexamples by introducing extra clausal implieatures "has been effectively argued against in /Soames 1982/. Motivated by the lack of explanation for these reasonably simple counterexamples, /Soames 1982/ constructs a mechanism that derives presuppositions that is a superset of the approaches suggested by/Gazdax 1979/and/Karttunen and Peters 1979/. /Mercer 1987/ contains methodological and empirical arguments against Soames' approach to the derivation of natural language presuppositions. This paper presents a reappraisal of some of the insightful counterexamples to Gazdar's method given in /Soames 1982/. Given an appropriate representation of the sentences in question~ the default logic approach to natural language presuppositions described in /Mercer 1987 /Mercer , 1988 /gives a simple and straightforward explanation for the presuppositional nature of these sentences.
General Background
There has been a long history of attempts to define methods that would produce the presuppositions of a sentence. The default logic approach that is highlighted here follows the general framework set out in /Gazdar 1979/. One feature of this framework is that the speaker is governed by Grice's Principle of Cooperative Conversation. Assuming these general guidelines allows a competence model of the hearer's interpretation to generate the appropriate presuppositions of sentences with the forms 'a or b' and 'if a then b'. Details of this process is given later.
Linguistic Presuppositions
Being implied by a natural language sentence and the natural (or preferred) interpretation of its simple negation is the primary quality that qualifies an inference as a presupposition. This evaluation *This ~esearch was partially supported by NSERC grants A7642 (to It. Reiter) and A3039 (to P. C. Gilmore).
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of inferences is called the negation test. Presuppositions are generated from lexical and syntactic contexts. Those contexts which pass the negation test can be termed presuppositional environments. Sentences (1)- (2) demonstrate some prototypical examples of presuppositions produced by the presuppositional enviromnents, factive verbs and definitions of words. In each of these examples tim truth of the affirmative a-sentence always implies the truth of the c-sentence, and the truth of the negative b-sentence normally implies the truth of the c-sentence.
(1) a.
b.
C.
Mary is surprised that Fred left.
Mary is not surprised that Fred left.
Fred left.
(2) a. My cousin is a bachelor.
b. My cousin is not a bachelor. c. My cousin is a male adult.
Projection Rule Procedures
The procedures for deriving presuppositions of complex sentences prior to /Mercer 1987 /Mercer , 1988 /that have received most attention are the ones based on the projection rule. These include/ Karttunen 1973 , 1974 979/~ /Gazdar 1979/, and /Soames 1979~ 1982/. The details of these theories are not important. What is of importance is the linguistic basis for these theories.
Crucial to any theory, of natural language presuppositions is the concept of a presuppositional environment. These lexical or syntactic enviromnents generate inferences, which are called presuppositions, whether they are in the scope of a negation or not. In addition to tl~e concept of presuppositional environments~ what is common to all the linguistic theories is the notion of a projection rule which projects the generated inferences as presuppositions of the sentence. The naive projection rule proposed in /Langendoen and Savin 1971/takes all the presuppositions from all the presuppositional environments conrained in the sentence and projects them as presuppositions of the sentence.
Although the modifications to this simplistic rule differ (see/ Karttunes 1973 , 1974 /, /Karttunen and Peters 1975 /, /Gazdar 1979 /, and ]Soames 1979 , 1982 , a common theme is that presuppositions are connected with surface phenomena. Although the methods differ in the importance that the semantic representation plays in the derivation of the presuppositions, without exception the potential presuppositions that are candidates for the (modified) projection rule are generated because the presuppositional environment exists in the surface form of the sentence;
A Default Logic Approach
The approach presented in /Mercer and Reiter 1982 / and /Mercer 1987~ 1988 /has a number of distinguishing features.
1. The method is based on inferencing in a logical system, although the logic is not a classical one.
2. The me~hod uses semantic representations of the naturM la.nguage sentence. Iu the case of 'if a then b' the semantic representation that is nsed directly is a derived representation (a D b can be derived from a > b, where > is StalnM¢er's connective for 3. All presuppositional environments that generate presuppositions must be within the scope of a negatiou eil:lter in the represen.. taUon el' the sentence or some logical for:m derived from tlfis representation.
ilow the method interact:~ with sentential adverbs is the main theme of this paper. The definition of presupposition and the working of the inference procedure in /Mercer 1987, 198 '8/ solves the seeping problenrs caused by the interaction of negation and other environments. In the discussion of sententiM adverbs it will be shown that the normal ~mntence-seope for negation is circunwented in certain circamst;utc(:s. This circumvention of the normal rule explains the presuppositi, utal behaviour of the sentential adverb environment. The default rules require some extra informa*:ion to guard against misuse of the default rules. This information is a conjunct in the prerequisite of the default rule. Except for this technical aspect this extra intbrmation plays no role. Since it creates long default rules, i have tell it out of all the examples. For further details see/Mercer /.987/.
Whenever the discussion concerns the default logic approach, I will assnme that the speaker's utterance has undergone the first phase of the interpretation process which generates a semantic representation (logical form) of the sentence uttered. This ,;entantic representation The verb believe sholdd be t~kea to lm?&lt first order dctiw~ble or conjectured from the default theory.
will be a well-formed sentence in a first order $4 modal language containing a countably intinite set of predicate syntbols, constant symbols, and variable symbols, plus the logical symbols A, V, D, -, Ks, ~nd Ps. The last two symbols, called modal operators, are to be interpreted as 'the speaker knows that' and 'for all the speaker knows, it is possible that', respectively. Although there is no general method known to generate this representation, some generM rules (:an be followed. Any sentence with an explicit negation is translated into the widely seeped negation of its affirmative counterpart. Any compound sentence is mapped clause by clause into a logical form, each clause being treated as a sentence.
Deriving Presuppositions in

Complex Sentences
The concept discussed herein --using default logic to derive presuppositions --is strongly influenced by Gazdar's method. I will present the representation of presuppositions in following sections with little explanation. For a complete discussion of how presul)postions are represented by default rules in a default theory together with how default logic proof theory captures Gazdar's idea of presuppositions being consistent with a context see/Mercer and Reiter 1982/or /Mercer 1987/. Another influence is the use of clausal implicatnres in connection with deriving presuppositions fl'om complex sentences, tu the default logic approach the clausal implicatures are used to control the division of the original theory into its first order cases. The clausal implicatures are derived fi'om the natural language sentence according to Gaz, dar's formal treatment of Grice's converss tional principles (/Griee 1975/). The sentence uttered by a speaker commits the speaker not only to the truth of the sentelme but also to the possibility of its clauses (its parts). So in tlm case of the speaker uttering 'A or B' or 'if A then B', unless tlmre is background knowledge or there are linguistic reasons to prevent it, the speaker b; committed to PsA, Ps-,A, PsB, aud Ps,'~B. These implicatures will provide the means to restrict the division of the theory representing the utterance into its cases.
Becmtse default logic proof theory does )tot display any analogue to the law of the excluded middle (the antecedents of tim default: rules nrust be provable and there is no equivalent to the deduction theorem) and because presuppositions do arise from the clauses of complex sentences, some form of analysis by eases is required. Since a statement is provable in a case anMysis only if it is provable in all cases, the choice of cases is critical. As in the case of a tirst order theory, too few cases would allow inappropriate statenmuts to Ire proved. In addition because of the non-monotonic nature of default logic, having too many casts could prevent al)propriate statements being proved.
In general the choice of cases must reflect two principles. Since the case analysis is a proof theoretic analogue of the model theoretic law of the excluded middle, each ease must completely determine the truth values of each of the disjunets found in the statement to which case analysis is being applied. Also, since the case analysis is justified solely on linguistic grounds (see /Mercer 1987/ for further discussion), the cases must reflect this linguistic situation. 3'o justify a. case, the possibility of the statement that distinguishes the case must 1re provable t¥om the original default theory. Since none of the modM statements take part in the proofs, they are left out of the cases. An example should clarify these ideas. The simple negated sentence, an example of which is presented in section 2.3.1, is just a special instance of the case analysis procedure. In the simple negated sentence, -~X (which is represented as Ks-~X), the possibility of the only case (distinguished by -~X) can be proved using the utterance and the theorem ~-Ks~X F-Ps-~X.
A Proof-Theoretlc Definition of Presuppositions
Definition This definition can be loosely paraphrased as: ifa is in the logical closure of the default consequents and is provable from the utterance, and all proofs require the invocation of a default rule and in the case of multiple extension default theories, a is in all extensions, then a is a presupposition of the utterance.
Important Differences
The previous approaches which have been mentioned above rely on two ideas. Firstly, presuppositions are generated from positive and negative presuppositional environments, if these environments occur in the surface sentence. Secondly, a number of different methods, collectively called projection methods, are used to screen out those potential presuppositions which are not to be projected. A brief description of Soames' method is given in section 4.1.
The default logic theory described in detail in /Mercer 1987 /Mercer , 1988 / approaches the problem of presupposition-generation from the level of logical representation. Presuppositions are generated from the logical representation if negated presuppositional environments occur in the logical representation of the natural language sentence or some logical form which can be derived from this representation. Malay of the results that the modified projection methods achieve are just proof theoretic results in the default logic approach to natural language ~For purposes of this definition, the only defaults in each Auco,o i a~e the presupposition generating defaults. In reality the default theory would contain many other kinds of defaults. The definition would have to be changed so that the proof of c~, requires the invocation of a presupposition generating default, and that a E Th(CONSEQUENTS{D'}), where D' is the set of presupposition generating defaults ~All of the examples presented in this paper deal with default theories having single extensions. In those theories which have multiple extensions, some way of stating that a presupposition is in all extensions is required. Since extensions of normal default theories are orthogonal, if An has multiple extensions then there exists a sentence fl such that Au I-A fl and Au V-a ~/?. I will call this situation being split along the fl-dimensiom If the extensions do not split along the ~-dimension then either ~ is in all extensions or a is in no extension. So if Au f-a ~ (which means that at least one extension contains ~) and Au V/a ~a (which means that no extension contains ~a, which means that the extensions do not split on the a-dimension) then ~ is in all extensions.
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presuppositions. In addition, once the logical representation of sentential adverbs is presented, it will be shown that the solution to the problem of presuppositions derived from sentential adverbs is again obtained in the default logic approach without any modifications.
3
Sentential Adverbs
The two sentential adverbs that will be presented are those found in the examples given in/Soames 1982/: 'too' and 'again'. Becanse one of the defining properties of a presuppositional environment is indio caring positive to the negation test 4, I will first look at each when there is a negation present. The interesting property displayed by sentential adverbs is that in addition to any interaction between negation and the underlying form, there is also an interaction between negation and the adverb. This interaction can be captured in two different logical representations.
The sentential adverbs have the added complication that they can take any part of the sentence as their focus of the adverb. The focus of the adverb will be capitalized. Although the verb of the sentence can be focussed, a presentation of this particular focus would require an event-based representation. I do not discuss this focus in the following. However, it, too, would behave analogously.
Too
The representations of 'kick too' are shown in (3) and (4). These two representations convey the different foci of the adverb, 'too', the subject and the object of 'kick', respectively. I will be only interested in the representation which focuses on the subject, that is (3). The explanation for presuppositions that arise from the adverb focussing on the object is similar to the discussion presented below.
(3) ~/xVy.KICK-SUBJ-TOO(x, y) =-KICK(x, y) ^ ~z.KfCK(z, y) A x # z (4) VxVy.KICK-OBJ-TOO(x,y) =-KICE(x, y) ^ 3~.ICICK(~, ~) ^ y # z
Sentential adverbs have a most peculiar attribute when they interact with natural language negation. The adverb can be either inside or outside the scope of the negation. Sentences (5) and (6) point out the two possible interpretations in the case of 'too'. One particularly interesting phenomenon is that all of the possible scopes of the negation and the adverb may not occur in surface form. For instance, [KICIt( Bill, ball) A -lx.KIClf(x, ball) 
.~KICK (x, ball) A x ~ Bill
What is important for tile presuppositional analysis is that only (8) can be a candidate for the negation test. One of the prerequisites of this test is that the supposed presuppositional environment is within the scope of the logical negation in the logical representation of the sentence. The logical representation of (9) does not meet this requirement.
Agai a
The situation for the sententia| adverb, 'again', is somewhat similar to that described above for 'too'. The adverb can be inside or outside the scope of the negation. Accordingty~ the adverbs found in (10) and (11) (11) is to be the following interpretation: At some time in the past Fred didn't call and during some interval of time which is important to the context in which tile sentence is u~tered, Fred didn't call.
(10) I,'RED didn't call again.
(11) FRED di&~'t call again.
Th.e representation for 'call, again' is shown in (12) (13) CALL (Fred, you, t) A :3tj .CALL(16~d, you, h) A tl < t (1.4) -, [ CAL t, (1, Yed, you, t 
) A i~tt. CAI, L( Ft~d, you, 11) A t 1 < t] (15) -,CALL( I;Yed, you, t) h ~tl.'-,CALL( Fred, you, h) A tl < t
As in the case for 'too', the only representation of 'again' that sanctions the use of presuppositioual machinery is (14) s.
Two Approaches to the Problem of Sen-~ tential Adverbs
Now I ca~ turn to these sententiM adverbs occurring in more complex situations~ in particular, examples similar to those provided in /Soaanes 1982/. The two examples shown in (1.6) and (17) are the kinds of situations which prove difficult for all projection methods.
(16) if JOHN kicked the ball, then BILL kicked the ball, too.
(17) If Fred called yesterday, then he will call again, SThis representation conveys only oac foci of the adverb, 'again', in this c~e, the subject. The object of 'calP, which in this case weald have to be recovered from cow, textual cues (it would pt'obably be 'yon' or 'us', though it could bc a ihird party) can be focussed as well. Since the discussion is similar to that given for ~too ~, I will omit it.
SThis is of coarse with cespect to the ~eutence represented by (13).
Soames ) Approach
Tile method proposed in /Soames (1982)/ is based upon the belief that the two major competing strategies for determining presuppositions (/Karttunen and Peters 1979/and/Gazdar 1979/) succeed in those situations in which the other one fails. 7 Tile proposed solution is to synthesize the two filtering strategies so that all the unwanted potential presuppositions are screened out.
The synthesis is performed in the following manner. First the potentialpresuppositionsofthe sentence are computed. Essentially, the potential presuppositions are all of tile presuppositions of the individual clauses of the sentence if the clauses were in isolation. The remaining potential presuppositions are those potential presuppositions which are not contextually or eonversationMly cancelled. This step is basically Gazdar~s method for generating the presuppositions of the sentence. The next step is to use these remaining potential presuppositions in the projection phase which is basically the one proposed by Karttunen and Peters. Since all of the examples that Mlow deal only with qf... then' sentences, I will provide only the projection rule for this kind of aThis rule is a slightly simplified version of the one given in/So,.mcs 1982/. It is sufficient for this discussion.
A Default Logic Approach
The default rule schemata which capture the presuppositionai inferences for the adverbs, 'too' and 'again', are (21) and (22), respectively. In the case of 'kick too' and 'call again' the appropriate instances of these schemata are shown in (23) and (24), respectively. 
3t'. CALL(x, y, t') A t' < t
Given simple statements such as those in (25) and (26) the preferred interpretations can be derived from the representation of the sentence and the appropriate default rules. I have shown the representation for (25) in (27) . The preferred interpretation of (25) is shown in (28). Similar representations can be derived for the preferred interpretation of (26). The complexity arises in the case of sentential adverbs being in either the antecedent or consequent clause of the 'if... then' sentences under investigation because the negation which appears in one of the cases can be done in two possible ways wheat a sentential adverb is contained in the clause being negated. If the negation of the consequent clause does not put the sentential adverb in the scope of the negation, the default rule which generates the presupposition cannot be used. The case --a ^ -,b does not infer the presupposition. Consequently, the case analysis cannot generate the presupposition as an inference from the sentence.
How (33)- (36), respectively. The negation in (33) is within the scope of the adverb because the adverb occurs in the consequent and because the antecedent is logically (azM conversationally) prior to the consequent. Therefore the scoping is dictated by that in the antecedent clause. Similar analyses can be given for (34) and (36). In (34) the adverb occurs in the consequent, hence the scoping is dictated by the logicMly prior antecedent, in (36) the adverb is in the antecedent, but because the consequent is coaversationMly prior to the antecedent, it dictates the scoping of the negation in the antecedent. In all of these cases the scope of the negation prevents the use of the presuppositionai default rnles to derive the presupposition that would be derived from the clause if it appeared in isolation. Only in (35) does the logically and conversationaily prior antecedent contain the adverb. The scope of the negation is therefore determined by the normal scoping rule, hence the scope of the negation is the whole clause placing the adverb inside the scope of the negation, and giving the appropriate presupposition. By reappraising the insightful counterexamples to Gazdar's theory given in/Soaznes 1982/, it is noticed that the semantic representation of'if.., then' sentences that contain a sententiM adverb in either the antecedent or consequent clause plays an important role in determining the presuppositions of the sentence. The inferential theory for natural language presuppositions described in ] Mercer 1987 Mercer , 1988 gives a simlde and straightforward explanation for the presuppositions] nature of these sentences.
